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IN TH[ SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL ACTON, ANDREW ACTON 
ana CAROL E. ACTON, 
Pla1ntitfs-Appellants, 
vs. 
J. B. DELIRAN, a Utah 
corporation; GERALD 
HOUSE; ERA REALTY CENTER; 
DARYL YATES and MARYDON YATES, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
case No. 19300 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Russell Acton, Andrew Acton and 
carol E. Acton, (hereafter referred to as "appellants") 
JUSt1fiably relied upon misrepresentations, made either 
mistaKenly or recklessly, by defendant-respondent ERA Realty 
Center ("ERA") prior to appellants' purchase of a small 
building and surrounding property in Cedar City, Utah. The 
concerned the legality of a water hook-up on 
the property. As a result of ERA's misrepresentations, 
appellants purchased a building and property with no legal 
water hook-up on it, anr1 subsequently learned that it would 
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cost appellants almost as much as the purchase price to acquire 
a legal water hook-up. Appellants are entitlec to have the 
real estate contract with defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran 
ano Geralc Hoese rescinded and recover them all payments 
appellants have made on the property since they purchased it. 
DISPOSITIOI' IN LO\IE:R COURT 
Following a Jury trial on appellants' claims for 
recision based upon fraudulent misrepresentations and mutual 
mistake, the JUry found that the real estate contract between 
appellants and J. B. Deliran and Gerald House should be upheld, 
and dismissed appellants' claims against them and ERA. The 
Court denied appellants' motions for a directed verdict and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, ano entered a Judgment in 
accordance with the jury verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the district court's 
Judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, there is no 
reasonable basis in the evidence to Justity the veraict of the 
Jury against appellants ana in favor of dEfenciants-reponaents. 
S':'f>.TE:·.Etl':' OF FACTS 
In or about February, 1931, appellant Andrew Acton 
went to defendant-respondent ERA for the of f1nainn a 
building and property in w'1ich to estatd1sh an iicto 
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with his brother, appellant Russell Acton. He was shown some 
rroperty by one of the ERA sales agents, Audrey Lebbon. One of 
those properties was the property at issue in this lawsuit, at 
the time owned by Daryl and Marydon Yates. Andrew Acton 
reJected the property at the time because of the run down 
condition of the building on the property. some time later, in 
June, 1981, Andrew looked at the property again with Mrs. 
Lebbon. At this time the property had been purchased, and 
relisted with ERA, by defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran 
("Deliran") and Gerald House ("House") although this fact was 
not known to appellants. At the time of the first visit, 
in February, 1981, Andrew was shown a description of the Yates' 
property, a "listing,• which stated that there was "water in 
building." During the June visit to the property, Mrs. Lebbon 
again showed the Yates listing to Andrew, although the property 
belonged at the time to Deliran, and ran water from a 
frost-free spigot on the property. Subsequent to the June, 
1981 visit to the property by Mrs. Lebbon and Andrew, a visit 
to the property was made by Mrs. Lebbon, Andrew Acton, Russell 
Acton, Russell's wife, Gail, and Robert Behunin, the Cedar City 
inspector. 
Shortly after that meeting, the appellants went to 
ERA's office in cedar City, Utah and had a telephone conference 
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call with defendant-respondent House, the principal of J. B. 
Deliran. The result of the conference was that the appellants 
signed an Earnest Money Agreement, drafted by Mrs. Lebbon, and 
the closing on the property was to be held on or about August 
12, 1981. 
Shortly prior to the closing, appellants hao a survey 
done on their property by David Grimshaw. The closing on the 
property was held as scheduled, on a Friday. Russell and 
Andrew Acton spent the weekend cleaning up the building on the 
property and went in the following Monday morning to see the 
water superintendent of Cedar City. At that time the water 
superintendent tolo appellants that there was an illegal water 
connection on the property, that the water in the building was 
being piped in improperly, and it would cost the appellants 
well over $20,000.00 to have a legal water connection 
established at the property. 
for $23,800.00. 
property had been purchased 
The Actons immediately went to Mrs. Lebbon's office at 
ERA and explained the situation to her. She was surprised and 
promised to cio all she could to rectify the situation. She had 
her broker, Brad Smoots, call Gerald House ano see if he woulu 
rescind the sale. Mr. House refusea. Appellants looked into 
other alternatives for obtaining water, without success. 
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brought an action in the Fifth District court for 
Iron County, State of Utah, alleging fraudulent 
m1srepresentat1on and mutual mistake and praying for recision 
of the real estate contract. 
The matter went to trial and was heard by a jury on 
hovember 8, 9, and 10, 1983 before the Honorable Christian 
Ronnow, circuit court Judge, sitting by designation. 
The jury returned their verdict that the contract 
between appellants and defendants-respondents should not be 
rescinded. Appellants' counsel, who had moved for a directed 
verdict subsequent to defendants-respondents' counsel resting 
their case, moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Appellants' motion for directed verdict, and subsequent motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, were denied by the 
court. This appeal then ensued. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The evidence does not support a verdict that there 
were no fraudulent m1srepresentat1ons or mutual 
mistake made and that the land sale contract 
between appellants and defendants-respondents J. B. 
Del1ran and Gerald House should be upheld. 
References to the Transcript of the trial will be 
designated "Tr." References to the Transcript will only be 
made to testimony before the jury, due to the nature of this 
appeal. 
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A. All of appellants' witnesses at trial 
testified that appellants had no 
notice, constructive or actual, that 
the water on the property they 
purchased was not a legal hook-up. 
Andrew Acton's testimony to the jury remained 
consistent throughout direct examination and cross examination 
by two defense counsel. Andrew testified that he and nis 
brother wanted to establish an auto repair shop in Cedar City, 
Utah, and pursuant to that desire, Andrew went to ERA and met 
with Audrey Lebbon, one of their sales agents, some time in 
February, 1981 (Tr. 172). He told her what he needeu in a 
building and property, including the need for water and sewer 
hook-ups (Tr. 174). He testified that Mrs. Lebbon took him to 
the property in February of 1981, at which time he reJected the 
building because of its run-down condition (Tr. 179). He tnen 
testified that, subsequent to examining the property at issue 
in this case, Mrs. Lebbon took him to a prorerty in Enoch, 
Utah, which was suitable to his needs but was zoned improperly 
for a commercial establishment. He and his brother attempted 
to get it rezoned by the city of Enoch but were unsuccessful 
(Tr. 179-180, 278). The next time Andrew visited the property 
at issue in this case with Mrs. Lebbon was in June of 1981. 
They visited the property at this time with Andrew's brother, 
Russell (Tr. 180-182, 279). 
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Subsequent to that meeting, Mrs. Lebbon set up a 
meeting between the Actons and Robert Behunin, the Cedar City 
building inspector. The Actons wanted to find out what the 
building codes were and what they needed to do to get their 
building up to city specifications so they could open their 
business (Tr. 182-184, 282-284). At this meeting, Mrs. Lebbon 
turned on a frost-free water spigot that was in the building, 
out of which water ran (Tr. 184). Andrew further testified 
that, either at the second meeting at the property with Mrs. 
Lebbon and Russell, or at the third meeting at the property, 
with Mrs. Lebbon, Russell, Russell's wife, Andrew and Mr. 
Behunin, Mrs. Lebbon showed Andrew a copy of the listing of the 
property, which indicated that there was water in the 
building. Andrew testified that the name on the listing was 
Yates (Tr. 184-185, 313). Andrew went on to testify that there 
was no discussion of the legality or illegality of the water 
hook-up on the property with Mr. Behunin (Tr. 185). 
Subsequent to that visit, Andrew and Russell Acton 
signed an Earnest Money Agreement, after talking on a 
tr,iephone conference call with Gerald House, and arranged for 
a survey to be done on the property by David Grimshaw (Tr. 
186-189, 285-286). The closing on the property took place 
after that, on a Friday (Tr. 192). The Acton brothers spent 
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the weekend cleaning up the debris in the building, and went in 
on the following Monday to see the Cedar City water 
superintendent, Theon (Bud) Bauer, about getting permits for 
the building (Tr. 194-195, 288). 
At that meeting, Mr. Bauer told the Actons that he 
could not find any legal water hook-up on their newly purchased 
property. The Actons then asked Mr. Bauer what it would cost 
to get water. Mr. Bauer indicated that the appellants would 
have to install a water main on to the public water main. He 
pointed out that the nearest available water was 2100 feet away 
(Tr. 194-196). Testimony by Andrew about the cost of getting a 
legal water hook-up to the city water main was not allowed, and 
later Mr. Bauer could not recall the figure he gave to the 
appellants. 
Subsequent to their meeting with Mr. Bauer, Russell 
and Andrew went to Audrey Lebbon's office at ERA and told her 
what had occurred. She was quite surprised and told them she 
would look into it (Tr. 197-198). She pulled the listing on 
the property and showea it to the Actons. It was the Deliran 
listing. Neither Andrew nor Russell had ever seen it before, 
nor had they known that the property haa changed hands since 
February of 1981 (Tr. 203-204, 287-288, 291-292 ). The Actons 
subsequently went to an attorney to look at other possibilitiPs 
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for getting a legal water hook-up (Tr. 198-199). They learned 
subsequently that the water that ran out of the spigot on the 
property they had purchased was an illegal connection running 
off of a water line used by their neighbor, Wayne Smith (Tr. 
199-200). 
In concluding his testimony, Andrew stated that the 
Actons could not get a variance from the city in order to use 
the water line that ran through their propErty from Mr. Smith's 
property, the cost was prohibitive if they wished to attach 
their own water line to the city water system, and appellants 
d1a not consider renting the property because they would have 
had to put substantial amounts of money into the building to 
renovate it and no one would rent it without water (Tr. 
200-202). 
on cross examination, Andrew reiterated his testimony 
on direct. He denied that he and Mr. Behunin ever discussed an 
illegal water connnect1on on the property (Tr. 233). This was 
later confirmed by Mr. Behunin (Tr. 407-409). 
Russell Acton then testified extensively, and in his 
testimony in response to direct examination and under somewhat 
grueling cross examination by both defense counsel, his 
testimony matched that of Andrew Acton concerning meetings with 
and representations by Audrey Lebbon and Bob Behunin. More 
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important, Russell testified about the circumstances of the 
survey done by David Grimshaw. During the survey, which 
Russell Acton helped Mr. Grimshaw, Wayne Smith came over and 
had some discussions with Mr. Grimshaw and Russell Acton. 
Russell testified that the only discussions held between Wayne 
Smith and Russell Acton had to do with property that Smith 
owned that cut off the Yates property from the public highway, 
and that the Actons would have to get some sort ot easement 
from Smith in order to have access to the property. At no time 
did the question of legality of the \later hook-up come up in 
discussions between Wayne Smith and Russell Acton (Tr. 296-299, 
314-315). 
carol Acton, the mother of Russell and Andrew Acton, 
testified briefly. She didn't have personal knowledge about 
the events preceding tne purchase of the property but she d1d 
testify that at no time during the negotiations for the 
property, the visits to the property, and the subsequent 
closing on the property did Andrew or Russell tell her that 
there was a potential problem with the water in the building 
(Tr. 329). 
Auarey Lebbon, the sales agent for ERA, test1f1ea 
next. She was obviously a cr1t1cal witness in that appellants 
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claimed that she was tne source of the misrepresentations about 
water availability on the property. Mrs. Lebbon's testimony 
everything to which Russell and Andrew Acton had 
testified previously. She stated that on the first visit to 
the property with Andrew, in February, 1981, Andrew saw the 
Yates listing, stating that water was in the building. She 
also testified that she ran water out of the spigot at that 
meeting (Tr. 342-343). On the second visit, with Andrew and 
Russell, she testified that she had a copy of the Yates listing 
with her (Tr. 344). She initially testified that she had to be 
working from the J. 8. Deliran listing, since that was the one 
that was in her office, or the current Multiple Listing Service 
listing (Tr. 347), but upon being refreshed with her testimony 
from her deposition, which had been taken prior to the trial, 
she aamitted that she had not obtained a specific copy of the 
Deliran listing, even though she knew the property had changed 
hands and had been relisted. She stated that she assumed the 
terms were the same, and did not know that there were any 
oifterences in the two listings (Tr. 348-350, 367-368). 
Mrs. Lebbon testified that water could have been 
turned on at the second visit, with Russell and Andrew, and 
that the water might have been turned on during the third 
visit, with Russell, Russell's wife Gail, Andrew, Mrs. Lebbon 
and Robert Behunin (Tr. 345-347). 
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She stated that she showed the appellants, tor the 
first time, the Deliran listing which does riot say there is 
water in the building, after the sale of the property. Mrs. 
Lebbon stated that the earnest money agreement, which she 
drafted, did not say anything, one way or the other, about 
water on the property (Tr. 358). She then confirmed what 
Andrew and Russell had said, that is, subsequent to the 
closing, and to the Actons' meeting with Bud Bauer, they came 
over to her office and told her that there was no legal water 
connection on the property they had Just purchased. She 
further testifiea that, prior to that day, neither Andrew nor 
Russell Acton had ever told her that there was a problem witl1 
water on the property (Tr. 359-362). She confirmed that the 
Actons asked her to ask her broker to talk with Gerald House 
about a recision of the contract. She did so (Tr. 362-363). 
Mrs. Lebbon was then subjected to intense 
cross-examination and did not change her story. Indeed, 
questions were put to her by the trial court Judge, and she 
testified that she knew the Actons needed water in the 
building, she assured them there was water in the bu1lrl1ng, 
and, although she reviewed the Deliran listing on the property 
prior to the purchase of the property by the appellants, she 
said she was not on notice that there was a question about the 
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legality of the water hookup (Tr. 364-365, 397-399). She 
aornitteo that she faileJ to make any notation on the earnest 
monej agreement about water on the premises due to an oversight 
(Tr. :J87). 
The appellants then called Robert Behunin, the Cedar 
City Building Inspector, as the next witness. Behunin 
confirmed the testimony of Andrew and Russell Acton and Mrs. 
Lebbon concerning his meeting with them at the property 
subsequently purchased by the appellants. He testified that he 
saw water running out of the spigot in the building. He 
further testified that he felt there was not a water meter on 
the property and that he told the Actons they would have to pay 
for a connection of a water meter on the property. He also 
testified that he did not believe there was any discussion 
about the legality of the water hook-up itself on the property 
(Tr. 407-409). At the time he told appellants of the need for 
a water meter, he tolo them that they should go see the water 
superintendent, Bud Bauer, about getting the water meter hooked 
up, and that any water or sewer connections would be under the 
city water department (Tr. 421). In response to 
cross-examination, Behunin stated that he knew that if there 
was no water meter, the connection was illegal, but Behunin 
also testified that he did not tell the appellants that the 
hook-up was illegal (Tr. 422). 
-13-
The above-cited testimony represents a crystallized 
view of the evidence appellants put on to show the 
misrepresentations made to them prior to their purchase of the 
property. The testimony is consistent, and, indeed, almost 
exactly synonymous among the various witnesses, even though the 
witnesses ranged from appellants to an agent of one of the 
defendants-respondents to disinterested persons. At this point 
in the trial, the testimony overwhelmingly showed reckless, or 
at least mistaken, representations made concerning a critical 
aspect of the property appellants wished to purchase. 
B. tjone of defendants-respondents' witnesses clearly 
contraa1cted or recutted any of appellants' 
witnesses' testimony. 
The defendants-respondents ERA and Deliran put on 
three witnesses who tried to undermine the testimony of the 
witnesses put on by appellants. The first witness, Nancy Hale, 
(spelled Hail in the Transcript), was the listing agent for the 
property purchased by the Actons on the Deliran listing. She 
testified that she was in the off ice when Andrew and Russell 
Acton came in after seeing Bud Bauer, notifying Audrey Lebbon 
that there was no legal water on the property. What 
defendants-respondents hoped to show with her testimony was 
that Russell or Andrew Acton acknowleoged tnat tl1ey han been 
told by Bob Behunin, the Cedar City building inspector, that 
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there was an illegal water connection. The transcript shows 
that Behunin testified that he had never said such a thing to 
the Actons, and Mrs. Hale's testimony only indicated that she 
askeo the Actons if they had been told by Behunin that there 
was an illegal water hook-up on their property. There was no 
response from either of the Actons (Tr. 439-441). 
Mrs. Hale's testimony does not support 
defendants-respondents' contention that the Actons knew about 
the water problem prior to closing on the property. Indeed, it 
supports appellants' earlier testimony that they had never seen 
the Deliran listing, which did not mention water on it (Tr. 
439), and Mrs. Hale admitted that she was in the courtroom when 
Behunin testified that he mentioned a water meter problem to 
the appellants, but not a water hook-up problem (Tr. 443). 
Defendants-respondents then put on Wayne Smith. Smith 
testified that he went on to the property during the survey 
being done by David Grimshaw and Russell Acton. His initial 
testimony was that he thought he n1entioned something about the 
problem with the water connection on the property, although he 
was not certain (Tr. 468-469). Throughout the rest of his 
testimony, he indicated that he really couldn't remember 
specifically what was said; indeed, he said "I - I can't 
remember a lot of times what I did last week, and that's a long 
-15-
ways back to know exact conversation of what was said on that 
day [the day of the survey]" (Tr. 470). Under erase; 
examination, Smith reiterated that he really couldn't ren1ember 
what was said on that day (Tr. 473), that he couldn't recall if 
certain conversations he had with appellants were before or 
after August 12 (the day of the survey) (Tr. 471), and that he 
wasn't exactly sure that water was even discussed on that day 
(Tr. 474). 
Defendants-respondents' final witness was David 
Grimshaw, the surveyor. Grimshaw testified that he didn't 
remember the exact words, but thought that Smith mentioned to 
Russell Acton that there was a problem with water on the 
property. Grimshaw testified that they didn't make any kind of 
a search for a water meter during the course of the survey, 
that the only things he was asked to do was locate the four 
corners of the property and see if the building was on the 
property (Tr. 48b). Under cross examination, however, Mr. 
Grimshaw stated that he did not specifically remember what Mr. 
Smith said to Russell Acton, but that he mentioned several 
things, including sor:iething about water (Tr. 491-492). Russell 
Acton, called as a rebuttal witness, specifically u1sputed 
Grimshaw's recollection and stated that Mr. smith was on the 
property for perhaps fifteen r:iinutes our1ng the course of six 
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hours of surveying the property, that nothing was said about 
11ater by Mr. Snith or Mr. Grimshaw, and that much of the time 
he was out surveying the property with Grimshaw, Russell was up 
to 25-30 feet away from Grimshaw and Smith, digging for one of 
the corner posts on the property (Tr. 495-497). He 
conclusively stated that the only subjects discussed with Mr. 
Smith were the boundary lines of the property and the access 
problem that resulted from Mr. Smith owning property across the 
mouth of the property Russell and Andrew Acton were thinking of 
purchasing (Tr. 496-497). 
Of the three witnesses called by the 
defendants-respondents, Mrs. Hale's testimony only confirmed 
that of the appellants. Mr. Smith's testimony was so uncertain 
as to be incompetent, and Mr. Grimshaw only vaguely recollected 
something discussed concerning water - a recollection 
specifically rebutted by Russell Acton. Detendants-respondents 
put on no other testimony, or any other kind of evidence, 
undermining any of the two and one-half days of testimony put 
on by appellants' witnesses supporting the contention that 
appellants had no idea that there was a problem concerning 
water on their property and that they specifically relied upon 
the representations, physical, verbal and written, that there 
was water on the property. 
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II. Under Utah law, the trial court erred in not 
entering a directed verdict, or JUagment not 
withstanding the verdict, because there is no 
substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. 
The most recent statement by the Utah Supreme Court on 
judgments not withstanding the verdict is in Gustaveson v. 
Gregy, 655 p. 2d 693 ( Ut. 1982 J. The case involved an assault 
upon one bowler by another bowler in a Salt Lake county bowling 
alley. This court concluded that the bowling alley operators 
were not liable in any way to the person assaulted, and the 
trial court should have grantea a motion for JUdgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. During the course of its opinion, 
the court set forth the prevailing Utah case law on the 
criteria that must be fulfilled in order to Justify the 
granting of a Judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This court 
stated that, 
"[T]he granting of a motion for Judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is only 
justified if, after looking at the evidence 
and all of its reasonable inferences in a 
light most favorable to the party moveo 
against, the trial court concludes that 
there is no competent evidence whicn would 
support a verdict in his favor." 
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d at 695. The court cited several 
earlier cases which specifically hold for the same 
proposition. In one of those earlier cases, Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 19 Ut.2a 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court set forth 
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above standard, but stressed that the party against whom a 
for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is made is 
only to "all reasonable inferences" (emphasis added), 
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d at 570. In the Koer case, a 
customer shopping at defendant's store allegedly slipped on a 
grape and sustained injuries. She sued for negligence, the 
trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the Jury verdict 
in her favor, and she appealed. This court stated that the 
plaintiff-appellant's mere fall did not prima facie establish a 
jury question, and that without more evidence, such an 
inference that the grape was on the floor, and, therefore, the 
employer knew or should have known of its presence, is not 
tenable. Id. 
The same analysis applies in the instant case. out of 
a three-day Jury trial, the only testimony proffered by 
defendants-respondents that in any way indicates that 
appellants had any notice, constructive or actual, that there 
was a problem with the legitimacy of the water hookup on the 
property they wished to buy is a surveyor who stated that 
something having to do with water was discussed by Mr. Smith 
when he was on the property during the survey. Grimshaw did 
not testify to anything specific, such as what was 
discussed concerning water, whether the discussion was about a 
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water meter, that water came out of the spigot on the property, 
or that the water connection was legal or illegal. Apparently, 
upon this slender testimony, the Jury determined that 
appellants were not the victims of fraudulent and reckless 
misrepresentations, or the victims of mutual mistake, and the 
jury returned a verdict upholaing the contract between 
appellants and defendants-respondents. Given this minimal 
amount of evidence, and particularly in the face of the wealtil 
of testimonial evidence put on by appellants during the course 
of the trial, the trial court Juoge's denial of appellants' 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is contrary to 
Utah law. 
At the trial of this case, appellants presented close 
to two and one-half days of testimony concerning the events 
surrounding their purchase of the property at issue. The 
tesimony included that of the appellants, that of the agent of 
defendant-respondent ERA, and that of various disinterested 
parties. No matter from what source, all of appellants' 
witnesses confirmed that appellants had been told that there 
was water on the property they purchased; they had seen that 
water flowed from a spigot on the property prior to their 
purchase; and they had seen what they thought correct 
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!1; ting of the proper"y, which stated that there was water on 
1•0 property. The first they learned of a problem with water 
,,n property was after they closed on the property. 
Given the legal theories upon which appellants founded 
their case, fraudulent (reckless) misrepresentation and mutual 
mistake, detendants-respondents could compromise appellants' 
case by providing evidence of notice, constructive or actual, 
to the appellants of a problem with water on the property. In 
the half-day that defendants-respondents put on their entire 
uefense, r1une of their witnesses clearly and indisputably 
testified that appellants haa such constructive or actual 
notice. one of defendants-respondents' witnesses confirmed the 
testimony of appellants' witnesses. One witness's memory was 
so bad that his testimony was practically incompetent, and the 
final witness testified to vague recollections about a 
uiscussion between Wayne Smith, David Grimshaw and Russell 
Acton about water, without any further description of the 
conversation. The Jury returned a verdict against appellants, 
refusing to rescind the contract between appellants and 
uefendants-reponaents Deliran and Hause. The trial court judge 
denied appellants' motions for a directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, contrary to Utah law. Appellants 
are entitled to a recision of the Real Estate Agreement between 
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them and defendants-repondents Deliran and House, and a return 
of all monies they have paid on the property to date. Such a 
result is based not only upon sound legal principles, but also 
upon the overwhelming weight of evidence presenteu at the trial 
in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, this 3rd day of January, 1984. 
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